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65 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL’S 
CONSTITUTION; A COMPARISON 
OF CIVILIZED NATIONS 
Mark Goldfeder 
ABSTRACT 
The art of constitution-making is never one-dimensional.  
In regard to the United States’ model, it has recently been ar-
gued that “[d]espite the enormous literature on the critical pe-
riod, including the foreign affairs imperatives behind the 
movement for reform, it is not fully understood that the animus 
behind the reform effort that culminated in the new Constitu-
tion was a desire to ensure that the United States would be in 
a position to meet its international commitments and thereby 
earn international recognition.”1  While there are obvious dif-
ferences, and while this concept is perhaps of even greater im-
portance and more poignantly felt for a nation that has so long 
been plagued with issues of de facto and de jure recognition, 
many of the same factors that would make it incomplete to 
view the purpose of the American Constitution as a strictly in-
ternal document hold true for our strongest ally in the Middle 
East.  After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the 
young country experienced diplomatic isolation and Arab 
League boycotts.  Today, Israel has diplomatic ties with 154 out 
of the other 191 member states of the United Nations, as well 
as with non-member Vatican City.  This paper argues that the 
                                               
 Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; SJD 
Candidate in Law and Religion at Emory University, alumnus of the Wexner 
Graduate Fellowship (Rabbinate, Yeshiva University). Served on the rabbinic 
staff at Mt Sinai Jewish Center in Washington Heights and the Beth Din of 
America in New York City; J.D., New York University School of Law, LLM, 
Emory University School of Law. 
1 David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early 
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition 116 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 
No. 222), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/222.  
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developing Israeli constitutionalism (this term is used broadly 
to cover not only the Basic Laws but also the quasi-
constitutional founding documents and semi-constitutional 
proclamations of the Israeli Supreme Court) is also to a large 
extent about facilitating the admission of the new nation into 
the community of civilized states.  From treaty making and 
economic development, to existential security issues, Israel 
recognized early on that it needed to quickly develop a strong 
and responsible federal government capable of enforcing com-
pliance.  It established a judiciary with capability of maintain-
ing and enforcing the law of nations, and even challenging the 
state itself.  More importantly though, while in the American 
model the framers were looking for and trying to gain trust in 
an economic sense, the Israelis are more focused on gaining in-
ternational respect, especially on civil rights issues. 
 
Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy. 
-Henry Kessinger 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Professors David Golove and Daniel Hulseboch seminal 
article, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, 
the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recogni-
tion, they argue that the animating purpose of the American 
Constitution was, in a large part, to facilitate the admission of 
the new nation into the European-centered community of “civi-
lized states.”2  Achieving international recognition, which en-
tailed legal and practical acceptance on an equal footing, was a 
major aspiration of the founding generation, and creating a 
constitution was a key means of realizing that goal.3  Towards 
the end of their piece, the authors observe that, “[t]he United 
States was the first postcolonial republic in which constitution-
making was inextricably linked to the pursuit of international 
recognition, but it was not the last.”4  They go on to note that, 
                                               
2 Id.   
3 Id. at 101. 
4 Id. at 223. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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“[b]ecause the United States was first, the connection between 
the federal Constitution and international recognition may 
shed light on constitution-making across the globe since 1787. 
We are in no position now to trace this connection; that must 
await further research, by ourselves and others.”5  This article 
will attempt to trace that connection in regards to the constitu-
tional movement and development in the modern State of Isra-
el. 
In accordance with A Civilized Nation, this paper argues 
that the developing Israeli constitutionalism (and the term is 
used here broadly to cover not only the Basic Laws of Israel, 
but also the quasi-constitutional founding documents and semi-
constitutional proclamations of the Israeli Supreme Court)6 has 
not only been about domestic governing; but also, to a large ex-
tent, about facilitating the admission of the new nation into the 
enlightened community of civilized states.  There are obvious 
differences between the founding of the United States and of 
Israel.  For instance, in the American model, the framers were 
looking for and trying to gain trust in an economic sense,7 while 
the Israelis are more focused on gaining international respect, 
especially on civil rights issues.  Yet, this concept of national 
citizenship is perhaps of even greater importance and more 
poignantly felt for a nation that, like Israel, has so long been 
                                               
5 Id. 
6 Daniel J. Elazar, The Constitution of the State of Israel, JERUSALEM 
CENTER FOR PUB. AFF., http://jcpa.org/dje/articles/const-intro-93.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2012) (“By and large, modern political science has emphasized 
the distinction between written and unwritten constitutions as basic to the 
understanding of constitutionalism, citing the American constitution as the 
prime example of the former and the British constitution as the prime exam-
ple of the latter. That distinction has come under increasing criticism in re-
cent years. Political scientists have pointed out that the American constitu-
tional document cannot be understood on the basis of the plain text alone but 
only as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States 
and in light of various conventions and usages that have grown up in the 
course of two hundred years. Similarly, the ‘unwritten’ British constitution is 
built around a series of fundamental documents (from the Magna Carta to 
the reform of the House of Lords after World War II) as hallowed in their way 
as their American counterpart.” Israeli constitutionalism, as it stands, falls 
somewhere in between.); see also Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutions and Consti-
tutionalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-30450 
00244.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
7 Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 105. 
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plagued with issues of de facto and de jure recognition.8  As in 
the American case, it would be incomplete to view the purpose 
of the Israeli constitution as that of a strictly internal docu-
ment. 
We will adopt as our framework the “basic underlying dy-
namic” that Golove and Hulseboch identified for developing 
constitutional governments, which broadly stated is the idea 
that constitution-makers undertake their projects not only to 
consolidate power at home, but also to gain recognition 
abroad.9  “To do so, they incorporate commitments to interna-
tional law in their domestic constitutions.”10  From treaty mak-
ing and economic development to existential security issues, Is-
rael recognized early on that it needed to quickly develop a 
strong and responsible government capable of handling its re-
sponsibilities to other countries and with the capacity to en-
force compliance.11  It also established a judiciary with the ca-
pability of maintaining and enforcing the law of nations and 
even challenging the state, while at the same time attempting 
to raise the country’s standing in the eyes of a watchful world.12 
Much like the Unites States, it all began with a Declara-
tion. 
II. THE FOUNDING AND THE EARLY DAYS 
The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, adopted 
on November 29, 1947 by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, recommended the termination of the British Mandate 
for Palestine and the partition of the territory into two states, 
one Jewish and one Arab.13  Part I Section B of the Partition 
Plan called for both the emerging State of Israel and State of 
                                               
8 See HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM 
TO OUR TIME 310 (2007).  
9 Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 223. 
10 Id. 
11 See generally GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIO-
NALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 3-9 (1993). 
12 Id. 
13 G.A. Res. 181 (II), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the 
%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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Palestine to adopt democratic constitutions.14  The very first 
foundational concept of Israeli constitutionalism was thus an 
attempt to gain approval and acceptance in the international 
arena.  
Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which was adopted 
unanimously by all the representatives of the newborn Jewish 
state on May 14, 1948, expressly stated that the form of gov-
ernment in Israel would be based on a constitution.15  The Dec-
laration also provided for temporary institutions, meant to 
serve until an elected Constituent Assembly adopted a consti-
tution that would establish the permanent institutions of gov-
ernment.16  It stated that Israel was a Jewish state, and prom-
ised equal civil, political, and social rights to all of its citizens.17  
Several draft constitutions were prepared prior to formal inde-
pendence, and one of them, composed by Leo Kohn, had even 
been selected as the starting point for the deliberations,18 with 
a final decision to come no later than October 1, 1948.19  
Things, however, did not go exactly as planned. 
As soon as the British Mandate ended, a violent war 
erupted, temporarily pushing aside all thoughts of anything 
but survival.  “By the time elections were actually held in 1949, 
the temporary organs were quick to transfer to the constituent 
                                               
14 Id. at 135 (“The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a dem-
ocratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to suc-
ceed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission.”). 
15 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 
1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.) [hereinafter Declaration] (“WE DECLARE that, with ef-
fect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the 
eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), and until the setting up 
of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be 
drawn up by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the first day of 
October, 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of 
State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall constitute 
the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called ‘Israel.’"), avail-




18 See Amihai Radzyner, A Constitution for Israel: The Design of the Leo 
Kohn Proposal, 27 J. EDUC. SOC. 369, 369 (1954).   
19 See Declaration, supra note 15 (explaining that at least this is what 
the Declaration called for). 
5
GOLDFEDERMCR (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2013  5:43 PM 
70 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXV:1 
 
assembly all powers of regular legislation.”20  The elected body 
thus became endowed with both legislative and constitutional 
authority.21  The Constituent Assembly was elected on January 
25, 1949, and it met for the first time on February 14, 1949.22  
Two days later it passed the Transition Act of 1949, providing 
that the legislature be called the Knesset and the Constituent 
Assembly the First Knesset.23  In early 1950, a long debate was 
held on the issue of whether or not to enact a constitution.24  
The governing coalition, headed by Prime Minister David Ben 
Gurion, and including the religious parties, mostly opposed the 
enactment of a constitution.25  While the religious parties’ fears 
of having any legislation that could theoretically trump reli-
gious law are well documented, some of Ben Gurion's main rea-
sons for opposing an entrenched constitution included a fear of 
limits on the powers of government and the legislature and a 
fear of judicial review over laws.26  Ben Gurion believed that a 
young nation that was literally fighting for its life against ex-
ternal enemies, while at the same time contending with eco-
nomic hardship and massive immigrant absorption, could not 
allow itself the luxury of severe structural limitations on the 
power of the government.27  The opposition, on the other hand, 
                                               
20 Ruth L. Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The 
Case of Israel, 11 CTR. FOR CONST. STUD. 345, 366 (2006). 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Shlomo Guberman, The Development of the Law in Israel: The First 50 
Years, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 19, 2000), http://www.mfa. 
gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches+of+Government/JudicialDevelopment+of+
the+Law+in+Israel-+The+First+50+Yea.htm (noting that the change, was 
not a mere matter of semantics; “it meant a departure from the initial deter-
mination to base the newly-established country on a democratic Constitu-
tion.” As we shall see, that departure was explained at the time as partially 
resulting from the notion that the existing population of Israel ought not to 
impose its ideals on the coming generations; “and therefore only when more 
Jewish immigrants came to the country - only then - would the time be ripe 
for drafting a Constitution.”).  
24 Id. 
25 See Ruth Gavison, The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights, 15 ISR. 
Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 113 (1985), available at http://www.gavison.com/a2645-
the-controversy-over-israel-s-bill-of-rights (explaining this debate). 
26 Id. 
27 Ruth Gavison, A Constitution for Israel: Lessons from the American 
Experiment, 12 AZURE 133, 146 (2002).  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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wanted a constitution to protect democracy and human 
rights.28  
The debate ended with a practical agreement that came to 
be known as the “Harari decision.”29  It stated, in principle, 
that the process of creating a unified supreme constitution 
would be postponed, and that the Knesset would instead pass a 
number of essential “Basic Laws,” which would ultimately be 
brought together in the form of a constitution.30  “The task of 
crafting the Basic Laws in order to create a constitution was 
given to a standing committee of the Knesset: the Committee 
on Constitution, Law, and Justice.”31  Neither the status of the 
Basic Laws nor the process and the timetable of their enact-
ment were specified.32  The proposal for the piecemeal writing 
of the constitution meant that every Knesset, to this day, is al-
so a constituent assembly that can enact Basic Laws. 33 
The Harari decision was the first concrete step on the 
journey towards an Israeli Constitution.  In a very real and ex-
istential sense, it was also about foreign policy.  In the ruling 
party’s view, in order to be accepted as a nation, Israel first 
needed to demonstrate its viability by shifting its focus away 
from internal political conflicts while continuing to defend itself 
from immediate threats.34  It is worth noting that Ben-Gurion’s 
opinion was not meant to reflect a disregard for the importance 
of human rights.35  Nevertheless, it was apparent that any con-
stitution would have to take into account some very real and 
                                               
28  Gavison, supra note 20, at 361. 
29 DK (1950) 1743 (Isr.) (It was initiated by Knesset Member Yitzhar 
Harari) (“The first Knesset directs the Constitutional, Legislative Judicial 
Committee to prepare a draft Constitution for the State. The Constitution 
shall be composed of separate chapters so that each chapter will constitute a 
basic law by itself. Each chapter will be submitted to the Knesset as the 
Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together shall be the 
State's constitution.”).  
30 See id. 
31 Gavison, supra note 27, at 154.  
32 Gavison, supra note 25, at 117  
33 Elazar, supra note 6. 
34 See DAFNA SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION; CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN ISRAEL 42-44 (1993). 
35 Id. at 41. At least if we are to believe his own numerous explanations 
both in speech and in writing. 
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very pressing security requirements.  There was thus a fear of 
two opposing dangers in writing a constitution at that moment: 
on the one hand, the lack of legal flexibility necessary to cope 
with the state of war, and on the other, a reluctance to adopt a 
constitution which would not give due respect to human 
rights.36  It was genuinely believed that a constitution of the 
latter type would not serve as a deserving model for genera-
tions to come.37   For Israel then, not only the content, but even 
the practical manner in which the Constitution could be writ-
ten, was influenced and shaped by outside forces.  The process 
could not even begin until Israel felt that it had the luxury and 
the peace of mind to be able to do it right. 
III. THE JUDICIARY AS FRAMERS 
If the Harari decision was step one, history has shown that 
the founding of the Supreme Court of Israel, with its emerging 
power of judicial review, was the second step in the establish-
ment of an Israeli Constitution.  During the Mandate period 
when the British instituted their legal system; Magistrate’s 
Courts, District Courts, and a Supreme Court were estab-
lished.38  With the establishment of an independent State, the 
Provisional Council became the legislative authority empow-
ered to enact the laws, and in order to prevent a devastating 
legal vacuum, the Council immediately decided that all the 
laws prevailing before 1948 should continue to be in force, with 
only slight modifications as prescribed by legislation.39  Judges 
of the Supreme Court were appointed by the Provisional Gov-
ernment on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and 
subject to the approval of the Provisional Council of State.40  
                                               
36 See id. at 45. 
37 See Gavison, supra note 25, at 136-37. 
38 See generally, Shmuel Orenshtein, Adv. Dir. of Legal Aid, & Michal 
Cohen, Adv. Dept. of Advice & Legis., The Israeli Legal System and Current 
Innovations in its Administration, Paper Presented at the Ministry of Justice, 
Jerusalem (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.eipa.eu/modules/EuroMedJu 
stice/Conferences/Istanbul_16_19Apr07/reports/10_Israel.pdf 
39 Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7, § 11 (1948) 
(Isr.).   
40 Courts (Transitional Provisions) Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 23, § 
1(c) (1948) (Isr.).   
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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By virtue of this authority, on July 22, 1948, the first five 
Supreme Court justices were appointed.41  The Court was em-
powered to begin functioning in September 1948.42  It opened 
its doors on September 15 and held its first hearing the very 
next day.43  Today, the Court functions as the Supreme Court 
of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeals, and 
the High Court of Justice.44  As The High Court of Justice, it is 
an administrative law court of first and last instance that has 
the authority to enjoin public officials and other courts, award 
compensation, and intervene in every case not within another 
court’s jurisdiction in which it is “necessary to grant relief in 
the interest of justice.”45 
In the early years of the State, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Declaration of Independence, and particularly the 
“individual rights” clause,46 as incorporating the “founding 
principles” of the State.   Accordingly, the Court used the Dec-
laration as a normative source in several decisions in which pe-
titioners claimed an infringement of their rights and freedoms; 
ruling that in cases where legislation may be interpreted in 
several ways, the laws should be interpreted in a way con-
sistent with the principles expressed in the Declaration.47  Uti-
lizing this method, the Court struck down several governmen-
tal decisions because they contravened fundamental rights 
enumerated in the Declaration.  For example, in the famous 
Kol Ha’am case, the Court guaranteed freedom of speech when 
it invalidated a government decision to shut down a newspaper 
                                               
41 Historical Background, THE STATE OF ISR., THE JUD. AUTHORITY, http:// 
elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/system/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Basic Law: The Judicature, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101, § 15 (1984) (Isr.). 
46 Gavison, supra note 25, at 116 (“THE STATE OF ISRAEL  . . . will en-
sure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irre-
spective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, con-
science, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of 
all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”). 
47 See Patricia J. Woods, The Ideational Foundations of Israel’s “Consti-
tutional Revolution”, 62 POL. RES. Q. 811, 819-20 (2009). 
9
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because of a controversial op-ed criticizing government policy. 48  
In doing so, the Court stated that: 
The system of laws under which the political institutions . . .  
have been established and function is witness to the fact that this 
is indeed a State founded on democracy. Moreover, the matters 
set forth in the Declaration of Independence, especially as re-
gards basing the State 'on the foundations of freedom' and secur-
ing freedom of conscience, mean that Israel is a freedom-loving 
country. It is true that the Declaration “does not include any con-
stitutional law laying down in fact any rule regarding the main-
taining or repeal of any ordinances or laws” . . . but in so far as it 
“expresses the vision of the people and its faith,” . . . we are 
bound to pay attention to the matters set forth therein when we 
come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the state.49 
While the Kol Ha’am decision did nullify an order promulgated 
by the Minister of the Interior to close down the newspaper for 
a few days, the Court still refused to accept the argument that 
an actual statutory provision enacted by the Knesset, or even a 
provision of the British Mandatory legislation that remained in 
force, could be struck down just because it was in conflict with 
a recognized individual right.50  As Justice Z. Berenson famous-
ly put it:  
The legal force [of the Declaration] exists in the [rule] that every 
legal provision should be interpreted in its light and to the extent 
possible, in keeping with its guiding principles and not contrary 
thereto. However, when an explicit statutory measure of the 
Knesset leaves no room for doubt, it should be honored even if in-
consistent with the principles in the Declaration of Independ-
ence.51   
Therefore, there was no sense of authoritative judicial review of 
Knesset legislation at that time. 
                                               
48 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior 7 PD 871, 903 
[1953] (Isr.). 
49 Id. at 884. 
50 See id. 
51 E. Gutmann, The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Isra-
el, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Histo 
ry/decind.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). Interestingly enough, it was actu-
ally Justice Berenson who wrote the first draft of what would become the 
Declaration of Independence. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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The move towards judicial review took another small step 
forward in 1984, when then newly elected Chief Justice Meir 
Shamgar expounded on Kol Ha’am and wrote a rousing defense 
of civil rights as related to embedded constitutional principles 
in the Israeli legal system, despite the fact that for years the 
State had avoided entrenching these constitutional principles 
in a written constitution.52  While in Kol Ha-Am Justice 
Agranat had almost poetically used the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as an expression of the “spirit of the people,” and 
thus figuratively, if not normatively, “binding” on the state (at 
least until it stood in contradiction to the explicit current “will 
of the people” as demonstrated by their elected officials), 
Shamgar took the idea one step further.53  For Shamgar, the 
idea that the Declaration embodied something greater than 
“normal law” was a strong enough binding principle on its own 
that it made a return to the debates over writing a constitution 
practically moot.  He wrote, “it will be enough . . . that there ex-
ists judicial-constitutional force to parts of the Declaration of 
Independence, which gave expression to fundamental princi-
ples that reflect the existing judicial spirit in Israel.”54  
Shamgar and his followers came to view both Kol ha-Am and 
the Declaration of Independence as documentation able and 
worthy to support the spirit of justice and rights that would 
otherwise be entrenched in a constitution.55  Although it did re-
flect an interesting shift in perspective, the majority of the 
Court did not ever share that view. 
Things began to change from another angle with the land-
mark case of Bergman v. Minister of Finance (1969).56  The very 
first Basic Law, enacted in 1958, dealt with the Knesset com-
                                               
52 Woods, supra note 47, at 819-20 (discussing Shamgar’s evolving posi-
tion). 
53 Id. at 819. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 819-20. 
56 See generally Benjamin Akzin, Judicial Review of Statute, 4 ISR. L. 
REV. 559 (1969) (translating HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance and 
State Comptroller 23(1) PD 693 [1969] (Isr.)) (this case has often been re-
ferred to by scholars as “Israel’s Marbury v. Madison,” although to be fair 
that term has also been used to describe Kol Ha’am and, as we shall soon see, 
the Mizrahi Bank case). 
11
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position, procedures, and rules.57  Only one section of the law, 
the section holding that elections in Israel will be “general, na-
tional, proportional and equal,” was entrenched; requiring a 
special absolute majority of sixty 61 out of 120 Knesset mem-
bers for its amendment.58  In Bergman, the High Court ruled 
that a law violating the equality of elections, by not funding 
new parties, could only be enacted with the consent of the spe-
cial majority.59  Since the law in question had not been enacted 
in that way, the Court invalidated it.60  In doing so, the Court 
established the principle that in addition to invalidating ad-
ministrative acts and governmental decisions that contradict 
“constitutional” values, the Court has the power to void actual 
Knesset legislation that violates a Basic Law.61  This has been 
entrenched by a special majority, thus developing the begin-
nings of a very limited de facto power of judicial review.  
While the Bergman decision was, in a certain sense, para-
digm shifting, over the next several decades the explicit idea of 
judicial review was invoked for only very specific reasons.  
Courts could review laws that violated entrenched provisions, 
not enacted with the proper majority, in the context of election 
laws that touched on the Basic Law: The Knesset.62  In short, 
they almost never could review these laws.  The Court contin-
ued to insist that even the non-entrenched Basic Laws were 
just regular laws, and no one argued that the Bergman case by 
itself meant that Israel now had a set of higher laws, or a con-
stitution.63  Still, in the years following their experiment with 
judicial review in Bergman, the Court did begin to increasingly 
assert a form of judicial oversight in practice if not overtly, in 
regard to administrative decisions, including executive and 
military actions, over which it had heretofore not claimed ju-
                                               
57 Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, 12 LSI 85 (1957-58) (Isr.). 
58 Id. Regular legislation can be amended by an ordinary majority of pre-
sent members. 
59 Akzin, supra note 56, at 563-64.  
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 See Robert A. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2013, 2046-47 (1988-1989). 
63 See id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/3
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risdiction.64  
The court’s expanding “activism” focused primarily on in-
dividual rights against governmental authorities, specifically 
those including employee rights, freedom of speech, national 
service, security, gender equality, religious freedom, and the 
like.65  In 1972, for instance, the Court declared that military 
laws do not have the same status as primary legislation.66  Ra-
ther, military laws must be bound by international law.67  In 
the case of Khelou v. Government of Israel, the Court, acting in 
its capacity as the High Court of Justice, not only used a form 
of judicial review to check military decisions, but also estab-
lished for the first time the idea of a constitutional-type appeal 
to extra-statutory sources for legal interpretation in nothing 
less than international law.68  In the words of Justice Kister, 
‘“[t]he military  commander  in any enlightened state . . . must 
act in  accordance  with the  rules of international law  which  
set  limits  and  boundaries  to  his  authority.”’69  
The Khelou decision famously granted standing to non-
citizen residents in non-sovereign territories to file suit before 
the Court.70  The use of international law as binding legal prin-
ciple was thus established through Israeli Supreme Court 
precedent in the 1970s, and may be an important component of 
Israel’s developing constitutional tradition.71  The fact that the 
decision is quoted frequently by domestic and international 
courts, and has been held up as a paradigm of the protection of 
                                               
64 Woods, supra note 46, at 813. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.   
68 The appeal to legal sources outside of the domestic nation-state context 
has created controversy in many country contexts, including, recently, the 
United States, where discussion of international sources in legal decisions 
was a subject of debate between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia. See Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Debate at American Universi-
ty, Washington College of Law on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign 
Court Decisions at American University (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript on file 
with the Federal News Service), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/foc 
us/news/1352357/posts; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).       
69 Burt, supra note 62, at 2032 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
70 See id. at 2032-33. 
71 See id. 
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habeas corpus rights, speaks volumes about what the incorpo-
ration of international law into underlying Israeli legal norms 
has done and can continue to do for Israel’s international repu-
tation and standing amongst the other “civilized” nations.72  
“Attempts to enact more Basic Laws and complete the con-
stitution continued throughout the 1970's.”73  Slowly, Basic 
Laws began to cover most of the central organs of government.  
Mostly, they reflected the existing structure of government or-
gans and their relations, and were fairly uncontroversial.  None 
of the provisions of these Basic Laws were entrenched, and 
everyone, from the Members of the Knesset to the members of 
the Supreme Court, agreed that they did not form a unified 
constitution.74  It became apparent that there were two main 
stumbling blocks to the completion of a constitution: the en-
actment of an agreed upon basic Bill of Rights, and of an ac-
companying Basic Law; and legislation that would openly deal 
with the issue of entrenchment, resolve the question of su-
premacy, and presumably, involve the creation of real and open 
judicial review of the laws by the courts.75 
In 1992, members of the Knesset, who supported the writ-
ing of a constitution and of a Bill of Rights, realized that their 
chances were very slim to complete legislation of both Basic 
Law Legislation and an accompanying Bill of Rights, and to 
declare the combination as the Israeli constitution, entrenched 
and supreme.76  Instead, in a Harari-like decision, the members 
decided that the best way to proceed would be to divide the Bill 
of Rights into separate Basic Laws, seeking to enact only those 
that enjoyed a broad consensus first, and hoping that once the 
basic structure was in place the rest would follow.77  The Knes-
set succeeded in gaining the consensus to pass two Basic Laws 
on human rights that year; Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
                                               
72 See, e.g., Brief for Bipartisan Coalition of Nat’l. & Int’l. Non-Gov’t. Org. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) 
(No. 03-334), 2004 WL 96763. 
73 Gavison, supra note 20, 368. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 370. 
77 Id. 
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Liberty,78 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.79  
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was fully entrenched, 
requiring the special majority of sixty-one votes in the Knesset 
to make changes.80  Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
was not entrenched, and it contained an explicit provision 
granting all prior existing legislation immunity from judicial 
review.81  In regard to future legislation, however, although the 
human rights laws did not specify judicial review, they did 
both contain a section stating that all relevant authorities must 
protect the rights enumerated, and that these rights could only 
be infringed upon according to law and in a proportionate 
manner; a limitation clause.82  Specifically, the bills stated 
that, ”[t]here shall be no violation of rights under this Basic 
Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, 
enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than 
is required.”83  They also declared that human rights were to be 
protected according to the values of “Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state.”84 
A minimalist interpretation would have seen that clause as 
another Declaration of Independence style add on; powerful 
prose but with limited legal weight.  A slightly less conserva-
tive approach might have taken that phrase as the weight-
giving solidifier it was meant to be, and would have added the 
two new Basic Laws to the short list of already entrenched 
ones.  However, Chief Justice Aharon Barak championed a 
more radical and active interpretation of the new laws, declar-
ing in the landmark case of Bank Mizrahi v. The Minister of 
Finance85 that their enactment – and particularly the new limi-
tation clause concept – signified the elevation of all Basic Laws 
to supremacy over ordinary legislation.86  Although in this par-
                                               
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 367. 
81 Id. at 370. 
82 Id. at 371. 
83 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 § 4 (Isr.). 
84 Id. § 2. 
85 Gavison, supra note 20, at 371 (discussing CA 6821/93 Bank Hamirza-
chi v. Migdal Communal Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.)).  
86 Id.  
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ticular instance the Court concluded that the legislation being 
challenged did not contravene the constitutional right to prop-
erty articulated in Section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, it nonetheless declared that, based on the limitation 
clause, the Supreme Court now has the power to judicially re-
view parliamentary legislation passed after the enactment of 
each of the Basic Laws.87  This historic decision put all of the 
Basic laws on top and established the modern Court’s practice 
of real judicial review of statutes.88 
What the Mizrahi decision means is that the Supreme 
Court has done what everyone has been waiting for; it declared 
that the eleven Basic Laws drafted over some forty five years 
are, in fact, already a constitution.89  It has also granted itself 
the power to analyze the constitutionality of laws and regula-
tions, and to strike down new legislation that contra-
dicts any Basic Law.90  Describing this “constitutional revolu-
tion,” Chief Justice Barak famously said that, ‘“[w]e are 
creating our own foundations. In a way, I, as a Supreme Court 
judge, have the sense that we are now the framers of our un-
written constitution.”’91 
IV. CONSTITUTION-MAKERS UNDERTAKING PROJECTS TO GAIN 
RECOGNITION ABROAD 
Having established the structure of Israel’s constitution to 
date and having established the Israeli Supreme Court as the 
de facto framers of the Israeli-Constitution-to-be, we can now 
take a closer look at some of the steps that the Court has tak-
en.  Before looking at the Israeli High Court in particular 
though, it is important to place it in the proper context of the 
particular international community of which it is a part. 
Scholars have noted the “growing tendency of jurists and 
                                               
87 Id. at 378. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 367 (referring to CA 6821/93 Bank Hamirzachi v. Migdal Com-
munal Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.)).  
90 Id. 
91 RAPHAEL COHEN ALMAGOR, THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND 
TOLERANCE: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST KAHANISM IN ISRAEL 176 (1994) (citations 
omitted).  
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human rights activists from different countries to identify 
themselves as part of a ‘unified international community.”’92  
Harold Koh, for instance, points to the role of transnational is-
sue networks and activists who trigger processes of nationali-
zation of international law.93  Others claim that this trans-
judicial communication is seen not only in the application of in-
ternational norms, but also in the recourse to comparative law, 
particularly in the area of constitutional law.94  This is espe-
cially important for Israel because, existing as it does without a 
fully written constitution, international law actually has the 
potential to affect not only the interpretation, but also the on-
going shaping of that document.  Indeed, as we shall see, it ar-
guably already has. 
By way of background, under Israeli law norms of custom-
ary international law are applied in domestic courts, except 
where inconsistent with domestic legislation; whereas norms of 
conventional international law are enforced only if incorporated 
in domestic law by legislation.95  
A judicial desire to resolve the seeming disparity between Israel’s 
obligation to respect international conventions to which it is a 
party and its failure to adopt their norms in its legislation, has 
resulted in an interpretive approach stating that statutes should 
be construed, as much as possible, as conforming to international 
                                               
92 Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law: A Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 611, 612 (2004), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/law/barakerez/arti 
cles/icon.pdf.  
93 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2658 (1997), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/f 
ss_papers/2101; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 649 (1998), available at http://digitalcommons.la 
w.yale.edu/fss_papers/2102. 
94 See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of 
Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 542 (1988), available at http://heinonline. 
org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/clr88&div=29&g_sent=1&collection=jou
rnals.   
95 The traditional justification for the distinction between customary and 
treaty-based international law was based on the principle of separation of 
powers. Treaties are made by the government, and not by the legislature. If 
they had the force of law the government could have the power to legislate 
with no involvement of the legislature.   
17
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customary and treaty-based law.96  
It is also important to briefly mention the status of Israel’s 
reputation internationally, particularly on the civil rights and 
freedoms front.  For quite some time, Israel has considered the 
international legal arena as another battlefield where its legit-
imacy is constantly being challenged.97  For years, Israel has 
had to contend with a plethora of anti-Israel resolutions passed 
in the United Nations General Assembly and its constituent 
organizations.  The best-known example was Resolution 3379 
of November 10, 1975, which concluded with the phrase: “Zion-
ism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”98  The reso-
lution also condemned Zionism “as a threat to world peace and 
security,” and called “upon all countries to oppose this racist 
and imperialist ideology.”99  The automatic majority in favor of 
the Arab nations in the United Nations has left Israel with lit-
tle or no maneuvering space and dependent on an American ve-
to in the UN Security Council.  
Perhaps due in part to its location and its particular secu-
rity concerns, Israel’s movements are scrutinized and criticized 
more than almost any other country.  So, it is no wonder that 
when looking to interpret, if not to form, its brand new consti-
tution, Israel would stake a great claim to being a part of the 
international legal world and tradition of protecting human 
rights.  Explicitly making this point, Chief Justice Barak, in his 
treatise on legal interpretation, stated that ‘“the international 
conventions on human rights to which Israel is a party should 
be given a special interpretive status, because they reflect the 
consensus of the international community to which Israel as-
pires to belong on an equal standing.”’100  This is why Israel has 
                                               
96 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 615.  
 
97 Arieh J. Kochavi, Israel and the International Legal Arena, 25 J. ISR. 
HIST. 223, 223 (2006), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108 
0/13531040500502866 #preview.  
98 U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg. at 84, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2400 
(Nov. 10, 1975). 
99 Id. (noting that on December 16,1991 the UN General Assembly re-
voked Resolution 3379, following a diplomatic battle that began when Israel 
conditioned its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference on the revoca-
tion of this resolution.). 
100 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 615 n.20 (citations omitted).  
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increasingly accepted international law in order to gain inter-
national acceptance. 
The Iraqi Detainees case, decided under Barak, is one of 
the first cases where international law played a part since the 
Court adopted its newer, more active jurisprudence.101  Peti-
tioners were Iraqi citizens who were arrested soon after they 
had crossed the Israeli border.102  They were kept in detention 
with an eye to deporting them to a third country.  In their peti-
tion to the High Court, the detainees argued that they were en-
titled to be treated as refugees and therefore demanded prohi-
bition against deportation to countries in which their lives or 
their freedom would be threatened.103  They also sought to be 
released from detention until their deportation materialized.104  
The Israeli Supreme Court accepted the view that the power to 
deport should be exercised in line with the limitations posed by 
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees,105 and ordered the authorities to reconsider their deci-
sions. 
Another important decision in our line of cases was the so-
called Torture case,106 “which raised the question of whether 
the Israeli General Secret Service could use physical measures, 
such as deprivation of sleep, shackling and vigorous shaking, 
                                               
101 Id. at 623 (referring to HCJ 4702/94 Al-Tai v. Minister of Interior 
49(3) PD 843 [1994] (Isr.)).  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, Apr. 22, 1954, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137. (explaining the prohibition of expulsion or return 
(“refoulement”);  
1.  No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler ") a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationali-
ty, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.  
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by 
a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger 
to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been con-
victed by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.). 
106 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 623 (referring to HCJ 5100/94 Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 53(4) PD 817 
[1999] (Isr.)). 
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for purposes of interrogating suspected terrorists.”107  The 
Court, in one of its landmark precedents, answered in the neg-
ative.108  While the formal basis for the decision was the princi-
ple of legality, as the General Secret Service was not author-
ized by Israeli law to use physical force while conducting 
investigations, it also drew heavily on the international norm 
that clearly mandates the prohibition of torture.109  Chief Jus-
tice Barak stressed that at the international level, Israel was 
obligated to refrain from torture, and that this prohibition was 
“absolute and without exceptions.”110   
Moving ever closer towards the constitutionalization in Is-
rael of internationally accepted norms and rights, when the 
question of the legality of charging parents supplementary fees 
for children’s high school education came before the Court, the 
policy was overruled based on the concept of the right to (free) 
education.111  In addition to Israeli sources that talked about 
this right, Justice Prokacia cited several international docu-
ments such as the International Convention on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
supported his conclusion.112  
Building on the above, the most definitively important case 
in this context was the petition of an organization representing 
families of children with Down syndrome.113  In Poria Ilit 
Committee v. Minister of Education, the petitioners argued that 
the state must cover the expenses of the special assistance that 
a group of children with Down syndrome needed when they en-
rolled in regular schools.114  The state, however, argued that 
                                               




110 Id.   
111 Id. at 625. 
112 Id.  
113 Ran Hirschl, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and Progressive 
Change: A Rejoinder to Mcclain and Fleming, 84 TEX. L. REV. 471, 591, 507 
n.109 (2005). 
114 Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 626 (referring to HCJ 4363/00 Commit-
tee of Poriya Ilit v. Minister of Education 56(4) PD 203 [2004] (Isr.)). 
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they only needed to finance their special needs in special edu-
cation classes.115  Justice Dorner decided to accept the petition 
based on the “unwritten constitutional right” to education.116  
Among the sources cited for establishing this Israeli right were 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.117  In this context, Jus-
tice Dorner used the presumption of compatibility of national 
law with the international obligations of the state to say that 
the state must inherently contain within it those same interna-
tionally recognized rights.118  The Court thereby elevated in-
ternational rights and standards to new internal and domestic 
constitutional heights.119 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In short, the new jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme 
Court has attached increasing significance to norms of interna-
tional law, even citing provisions of international instruments 
that have not ever been incorporated into domestic legislation, 
and going so far as establishing and recognizing unwritten con-
stitutional givens.  In return for the gifts that international law 
has contributed to its constitutional corpus, the Court has 
handed down precedent setting decisions in areas such as de-
tainee rights120 and targeted killings.121  These decisions have 
                                               
115 Id.  
116 Id. 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 622-23.  
121 Compare HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel 
v. The Government of Israel 56(5) PD 834 [2006] (Isr.), with Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: comparing Hamdan and the 
Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 373, 393 
(2007) (“The paradox that therefore emerges from comparing these two deci-
sions is that Hamdan, the one which is on its face more favorable to the peti-
tioners, might actually be less so in the long term. The Israeli Supreme Court 
is clearly superior to its US counterpart in applying humanitarian law to the 
phenomenon of terrorism, and it is even more so in its application of human 
rights law. This might actually prove to be the most enduring quality of the 
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dealt with some of the day’s toughest questions and have paved 
the way for future thought and international development.122  
In doing so, the Court, and Israel as its sponsor, has participat-
ed in the complex processes of dialogue and inspiration within 
the international community of judges and jurists; contributing 
to the setting of standards for the protection of human rights in 
both Israel and the world and elevating Israel’s status to being 
recognized as one of the “enlightened” or civilized nations at 
the table, at least in the area of human rights jurisprudence.123 
As Golove and Hulsebosch noted in regard to the early 
United States, recognition “brings more than legal status. It al-
so has powerful existential dimensions.”124  The desire for 
recognition, as Clifford Geertz observes, unites the vast majori-
ty of postcolonial nations.  “[T]he peoples of the new states,” 
Geertz argued: 
Are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly inter-
dependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives—the 
desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, 
hopes, and opinions “matter,” and the desire to build an efficient, 
dynamic modern state. The one aim is to be noticed: it is a search 
for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly 
acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self as 
“being somebody in the world.” The other aim is practical: it is a 
demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effec-
                                                                                                         
Targeted Killings judgment: that it shows so clearly how the relationship be-
tween human rights law and humanitarian law can be a two-way street, and 
how that relationship can be far more complex than is usually thought.”). See 
generally Anthony Dworkin, Israel’s High Court on Targeted Killing: A Model 
for the War on Terror, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.cri 
mesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html. 
122  J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings 
Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (2002). 
123 See Barak-Erez, supra note 92, at 631 (depicting that while the Court 
still struggles with questions in regard to its willingness to limit government 
action in the disputed territories, they are undeniably at the forefront of the 
challenge that the international world of law is facing; updating the concepts 
of internal law and the Geneva Conventions to fit a war on terror. Since Isra-
el has not yet completed formulating its constitution, international law has 
the potential at this stage to inspire the process by imbuing human rights 
with meaning, and to influence the drafting of future Basic Laws.). 
124 Golove and Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 224. 
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tive political order, [and] greater social justice.125 
After the establishment of the State in 1948, Israel, alone 
and inexperienced, was forced to endure diplomatic isolation 
and harsh Arab League boycotts.126  Today, Israel has diplo-
matic ties with 159 out of the other 192 member states of the 
United Nations, as well as with non-member Vatican City and 
the European Union.127  While there are many factors that 
have gone into this newfound level of acceptance, early Israeli 
constitutionalism, especially the incorporation of international 
norms and rights into fundamental Israeli national jurispru-
dence as a method and way of foreign policy, has gone a long 
way towards facilitating Israel’s admission into the community 
of civilized states.  Not only has Israel established and en-
shrined greater and clearer protections for its own human 
rights issues, Geertz’s second aim, is that Israel has also con-
tributed to the conversation and come to be recognized for its 
own unique talents and expertise.  Its Courts are quoted in our 
courts as “somebody in the world.”128 
As with the America of the 1780s, internally, Israeli socie-
ty is deeply divided on key issues, but it has guaranteed its cit-
izens levels of political freedom, welfare, and education un-
known in the region.129  While Israel is host to a number of 
groups seeking to change the country in accordance with their 
own visions, these groups all share an interest in common; that 
                                               
125 Id. (quoting Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial 
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, OLD 
SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA 
105 (1963)).  
126 Israel’s Bilateral Relations, Israel’s Diplomatic Missions Abroad: Sta-
tus of Relations, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/for 
eign%20relations/bilateral%20relations/ (last visited Mar. 10 2013). 
127 Id. 
128 See generally, Israel's Bilateral Relations, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreign%20relations/bilateral%20relation 
s/ (last visited Mar. 10 2013) (noting that Israel is still very much at odds 
with much of the civilized world in regard to the application of specific inter-
national law, particularly in the disputed territories. They are, however, at 
least genuinely considered to be part of the conversation, and worth talking 
to, which, for the purposes of this paper, is definitive recognition.). 
129 Gavison, supra note 25, at 135; see generally Donna E. Arzt, Growing 
a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty and Community in Israel and the United 
States, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 256-63 (1994). 
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Israel should continue to secure their basic rights.130  Israel to-
day, fragmented and strife-ridden, may at times seem farther 
than ever from seeing a constitutional process through, and the 
sense of crisis that has enveloped the country since negotia-
tions with the Palestinians collapsed in October 2000 tends to 
direct attention to issues that seem more urgent.131  Outside of 
the country, recent polls show that Israel is still viewed nega-
tively by many.132  Nevertheless, it is precisely difficult times 
such as these that reveal the pressing need for a constitution, 
and that are most likely to precipitate its creation.133  Only in 
these moments is the need most keenly felt to forge and finalize 
one basic document, a document that would create a shared po-
litical framework and provide a basis and starting point for 
both internal domestic disputes and international comparison 




                                               
130 Gavison, supra note 25, at 135.  
131 Id. 
132 Views of Europe Slide Sharply in Global Poll, While Views of China 




133 Gavison, supra note 25, at 135. 
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